Methods and sequencing of privatization: what post-socialist countries can learn from Chile by Agarwal, Jamuna Prasad & Nunnenkamp, Peter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Agarwal, Jamuna Prasad; Nunnenkamp, Peter
Working Paper
Methods and sequencing of privatization : what post-
socialist countries can learn from Chile
Kiel Working Papers, No. 527
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Agarwal, Jamuna Prasad; Nunnenkamp, Peter (1992) : Methods and
sequencing of privatization : what post-socialist countries can learn from Chile, Kiel Working
Papers, No. 527, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/611Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 527
METHODS AND SEQUENCING OF PRIVATIZATION
What Post-Socialist Countries





Institutfiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787
\Kiel Institute of World Economics
Diisternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Department IV
Kiel Working Paper No. 527
METHODS AND SEQUENCING OF PRIVATIZATION
What Post-Socialist Countries





The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World Econo-
mics, are responsible for the contents and distribution of Kiel
Working Papers.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticism and sugges-
tions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with
them.I. Introduction*
The economic transformation of post-socialist countries can hard-
ly be mastered if production and investment decisions remain
within the domain of the state. However, large-scale privatiza-
tion in Central and Eastern"Europe appears to be rather difficult
and time consuming [Inotai, 1992, pp. 170ff.]. Privatization has
to proceed under unfavourable circumstances, e.g. uncertain pro-
perty rights, institutional deficiencies, non-existent capital
markets and insufficient savings. This renders it difficult to
speed up the privatization process and to avoid major policy
failures by drawing on the experience of previous privatizations
in other countries. The experience of Western market economies is
of limited value because privatization was confined to selected
enterprises. Moreover, the major impediments to privatization in
post-socialist countries are largely absent in advanced market
economies. In principle, the same arguments may be raised against
using the experience of developing countries as a reference
case. However, there is one notable exception, namely the large-
scale privatization of state-owned enterprises in Chile since
1974.
The, Chilean experience has been largely neglected in the current
discussion on privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. This
paper will critically review the achievements and pitfalls of
privatization in Chile and evaluate the lessons for post-soci-
alist countries. The analysis proceeds as follows: Section II
reveals that major privatization issues which are currently dis-
cussed in the East European context figured prominently in Chile
This paper reports research undertaken in the project "The Role
of Stabilization, Liberalization and Privatization in the Eco-
nomic Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe". Financial
support provided by the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged. The authors would like to thank the participants
of a seminar at the Kiel Institute for their constructive cri-
. ticism on an earlier draft of this paper.
For an overview on privatization in developing countries, see
Berg, Shirley [1987].- 2 -
as well. Similarities refer to (i) possible trade-offs between
objectives to be achieved by privatization, (ii) the pros and
cons of different privatization methods, and (iii) the sequencing
of privatization under conditions of macroeconomic instability
and distorted market structures. The Chilean experience with dif-
ferent privatization phases during the 1970s and 1980s is
analyzed in Section III. The paper concludes by assessing which
insights can be gained from the Chilean experience for the
privatization process in Central and Eastern Europe (Section IV).
II. Privatization Issues in Eastern Europe and Chile: Basic
Similarities
It is frequently argued that privatization in Eastern Europe has
to be rapid and comprehensive to make the economic transition
irreversible, to foster allocative and adaptive efficiency, and
to render macroeconomic stabilization more credible. The idea to
restructure and revitalize state enterprises in the first step,
before transfering them to private owners, is rejected by those
who expect greater efficiency and adjustment flexibility from
rapid privatization. To. speed up the privatization process, it
has been suggested to sell state-owned enterprises at open
2 auctions to the highest bidder. Firms for which a buyer cannot
be found within a predetermined time span should be closed down
to prevent a further waste of public resources.
Various objections have been raised against rapid and comprehen-
sive privatization schemes. Critics emphasize possible trade-offs
among different privatization goals. The public support of the
transformation process as a whole may be undermined if rapid
For a more detailed discussion on the goals to be achieved by
rapid privatization, see e.g. Blanchard, Layard [1992]; Hinds
[1990]; Schmieding [1992]; Nunnenkamp, Schmieding [1991];
Roland, Verdier [1992]; Winiecki [1990].
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For the proposal to create independent holding companies or
privatization agencies for managing the sale of state enter-
prises, see Schmieding, Koop [1991].- 3 -
privatization results in an unequitable distribution of wealth
and ownership. Political opposition against the transformation
of centrally planned economies into market economies might be re-
inforced if unemployment problems mount due to rapid privatiza-
tion of overstaffed state enterprises. Another concern is that
public sector accounts may be affected negatively. Large-scale
privatization is expected to add to serious fiscal problems be-
cause of depressed selling prices in the presence of low national
savings and rudimentary capital markets. Furthermore, privatiza-
tion is considered an insufficient condition for creating compe-
titive market structures and, thereby, containing transition
problems. It is expected to boil down to the replacement of state
monopolies by private monopolies if state-owned conglomerates
were not broken down into smaller and independent units before
privatizing them [Bonin, 1992; Newbery, 1991].
The sequencing of privatization in the economic transition of
Central and Eastern Europe is heavily debated on theoretical
grounds. Some authors, e.g. Lipton and Sachs [1990], conclude
that privatization should only be the third step of economic
transformation. In their view, it must be postponed until after
macroeconomic instability and distorted incentive systems have
been removed, in order to reduce the uncertainty about the future
economic development and improve the informative value of rela-
tive prices. In sharp contrast, authors such as Lewandowski and
Szomburg [1989, p. 257] consider "property reform as a basis for
social and economic reform".
The persistent controversies on the pros and cons of rapid and
comprehensive privatization are difficult, if not impossible, to
overcome on purely theoretical grounds. Surprisingly, the Chilean
Public resentment is most likely if state managers take undue
advantage of the institutional vacuum in the early phases of
economic transition and enrich themselves by acquiring state
assets. For empirical evidence on the so-called "spontaneous"
privatization in Poland and Hungary, see Grosfeld [1990, pp.
147ff.]; Economist [1990, p. 16]; on the political economy of
privatization, see Winiecki [1992].- 4 -
experience has been largely ignored in the current discussion on
the appropriate design and implementation of privatization pro-
grams in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to other priva-
tization episodes, the case of Chile reveals remarkable similari-
ties to the present situation in post-socialist countries:
- First, privatization involved about 600 enterprises. In 1973,
the state enterprise sector accounted for almost one half of
gross domestic product [Nankani, 1988, p. 18]. State enter-
prises were not only dominant in services such as public utili-
ties, transportation and communication, but also in the finan-
cial sector and in mining. Their share in manufacturing output
reached 40 per cent [Saez, 1991, p. 5]. Though this is signifi-
cantly below the respective figures for post-socialist coun-
tries, the ov
too different.
tries, the overall task of the privatization in Chile was not
- Secondly, the case of Chile may provide valuable insights into
the trade-offs and inconsistencies between different privatiza-
tion objectives. As presently in Eastern Europe, privatization
was motivated by a variety of goals, ranging from microeconomic
efficiency and enhanced competitiveness to the consolidation of
public sector accounts and a more equitable distribution of
wealth.
- Thirdly, heavily debated issues such as the restitution of
expropriated owners, the valuation of state enterprises, and
public acceptance of privatization schemes figured prominently
also in Chile. The valuation of firms was impeded not only by
institutional weaknesses, but also by the overstaffing, use of
outmoded technology and outsized plants of state-owned enter-
prises . The perceived underpricing of sales was a prominent
feature in the public debate on privatization.
Until recently, the private sector (excluding the shadow econo-
my) contributed typically less than 10 per cent to gross domes-
tic product [Schmieding, Koop, 1991, p. 6]. The major exception
was Poland with a share of about 20 per cent. In many cases,
the dominance of state enterprises was even more pronounced in
industrial production.- 5 -
- Fourthly, different modes of divestiture were applied in the
various phases of privatization in Chile, including bidding
mechanisms, stock market auctions, direct sales to workers, and
widespread distribution of shares among the public ("popular
capitalism") [Nankani, 1990]. The privatization programs of
East European governments encompass a similarly wide spectrum
of options. The ongoing discussion of the pros and cons of
different privatization methods may benefit from the empirical
evidence available from Chile.
- Fifthly, "most of the Chilean privatizations took place while
the economy was in the midst of a rapid and drastic structural
reform, from a highly unstable, intervened and protectionist
economy, to a relatively stable, open market economy" [Liiders,
not dated, p. 1]. Hence, Chile provides an interesting refe-
rence case on how to integrate privatization into a comprehen-
sive scheme of economic transformation in Central and Eastern
Europe.
- Finally, structural and institutional deficiencies, which are
frequently stressed as important impediments to privatization
in post-socialist countries, were also prevalent in Chile. The
national savings rate was particularly low before privatization
started (1972/73: about 10 per cent [Edwards, 1985, p. 239]).
The capacity of the domestic financial' market was very limited
[Larrain, 1988; Marshall, Montt, 1988]. The regulatory frame-
work of financial intermediation and the supervision of finan-
cial institutions were weak or non-existent.
In retrospect, the economic transformation of Chile was quite
successful. After the economic crisis of the early 1980s, real
gross domestic product increased by an annual average of 5.4 per
cent [ECLAC, 1991, p. 37].
1 Between 1985 and 1990, private in-
vestment recovered most impressively in Chile (by 130 per cent)
within a sample of 35 developing countries [Pfeffermann, Madaras-
- This figure was high by world and developing country standards
where it was below 4 per cent in 1984-1989 [IMF, 1991].- 6 -
sy, 1992, p. 4]. However, privatization was not an undisputed
success story from the very beginning. The strengths and weaknes-
ses of the Chilean approach towards privatization are analyzed in
more detail in the subsequent section. The privatization methods
changed significantly since 1974, and so did the economic en-
vironment in which privatization proceeded during the 19 70s and
1980s. This provides the opportunity to draw on empirical evi-
dence in discussing appropriate methods, the sequencing and the
possible trade-offs of privatization in Central and Eastern
Europe.
III. The Chilean Experience
1. Institutional Setting and Privatization Methods
In September 1973, when the army overthrew the Allende govern-
ment, the new regime inherited about 600 state enterprises. Most
of them were controlled by CORFO (Corporaci6n de Fomento de la
Producci6n de Chile) and acquired during the socialist era. CORFO
had been the most important developmental public agency to
create, acquire and manage firms. Since its establishment in
1939, it had come to possess a strong influence in such different
sectors as electricity, telecommunication and steel. Since 1973
CORFO became the main institution entrusted with the privatiza-
tion of public enterprises. It was expected to possess the best
experience on the working of public sector firms and, thus, to be
2
able to privatize them better than any other government organi-
zation .
Within CORFO, three institutional bodies had to carry out the
privatization of state enterprises, viz. (1) the Council, (2) the
Privatization Committee and (3) the Normalization Unit. The
Depending on the definition of nationalization or takeover,
this number differs from one source to another [see e.g.
Nankani, 1988, p. 18; Yotopoulos, 1989, pp. 685 and 690].
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Including the state enterprises which were under the direct
control of ministries and other government departments.
Before 1976 known as Enterprise Managership.- 7 -
Council functioned also as the board of directors of CORFO and
was finally responsible for privatization. The proposals for
privatizations came generally from the central government. In the
cases of small enterprises they originated sometimes from within
CORFO. Supervisory work of the implementation was done by the
Privatization Committee. The actual administration of the dive-
stiture program was carried out by the Normalization Unit. How-
ever, this division of labour was kept flexible to accommodate
the necessary deviations from this procedure [Nankani, 1988, p.
24].
Besides institutional arrangements, the success of privatization
programs depends also on the appropriate choice of buyers,
timing, methods and terms of financing. The Chilean government
tried from time to time several privatization methods and their
combinations. Changes in privatization methods were largely due
to the perceived failure of earlier approaches. The most impor-
tant of these methods were the following.
Return to previous owners: One year after seizing power, the
military government started returning to their previous owners
the firms which were nationalized by the Allende regime. Most of
these enterprises were denationalized during the first privatiza-
tion phase (1974-1975). This restitution did not involve any
payments for either of the parties [Nankani, 1988, p. 27]. Re-
stitution in Chile did not create major problems. The time
elapsed since nationalization was not very long, and old owners
were easily identified. Therefore, restitution presented a viable
solution in Chile. By contrast, conditions for restitution are
very difficult in Central and Eastern Europe. Property titles are
badly recorded and previous owners, wherever identifiable, have
lost their managerial qualifications due to the long time span
since nationalization. Consequently, in cases of property claims
financial compensation of previous owners is a superior alterna-
tive in post-socialist European countries. This would remove
uncertainties with respect to property rights and the ensuing
delay of investment activities.Competitive bidding: This was the most common method adopted
during the second phase of privatization (1975-1983). It in-
volved the setting of bid conditions and issuing notification
usually through media advertising. Following an auction for which
there were only a few qualification criteria, CORFO negotiated
the terms of agreement with the most qualified bidder. The pur-
chasers were generally large firms. Sometimes smaller domestic
firms and employee cooperatives participated in the bidding. Up
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to one-tenth of the agreed price had to be paid immediately. The
balance could be financed through a loan from CORFO, usually with
a maturity of 8 to 15 years and a real interest rate of 8 to 12
per cent.
According to Nankani [1988, p. 27], 47 firms were sold to domes-
tic and 10 to foreign buyers through competitive bidding between
1975 and 1978. Most of them landed into problems shortly after
privatization. They were either declared bankrupt or rescued by
the government when a deep recession hit the country in the
early 1980s [ibid]. This unfavourable outcome of privatization
through competitive bidding has frequently been attributed to an
inadequate screening of buyers with regard to their financial,
technical and managerial capabilities. Moreover, the debt-led
financing of privatization through government loans resulted in
high debt/equity ratios and rendered the privatized firms finan-
cially very unstable [Saez, 1991, p. 23].
Bidding as a technique of privatization was not given up by Chile
in later years. But the assessment of earlier privatization epi-
sodes resulted in several adjustments, e.g., in the selection of
potential buyers and the financing of privatization operations.
In order to avoid concentration of privatized firms in fewer
hands, bidding was now restricted to prequalified investors.
In those cases, where the share of ownership of CORFO was less
than 10 per cent the shares were auctioned through the stock
market [Saez, 1991, p. 243].
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In case of the privatization of banks, there was a minimum
downpayment of 20 per cent [Saez, 1991, p. 23].- 9 -
Interest rates charged were lowered. Conglomerates had to make a
100 per cent cash payment. Large companies were no longer pri-
vatized fully at a time. Shares were rather sold in various in-
stalments to avoid an overburdening of financial markets. Fur-
thermore, other privatization methods gathered momentum.
"Popular capitalism": This method implies an allotment of shares
to a large number of small investors. It was sought as an im-
provement over the bidding method which had been blamed for ex-
cessive concentration of property without ensuring efficient
management. Sizeable portions of the assets of two banks (Banco
de Chile and Banco de Santiago), two pension funds (Santa Maria
and AFP Provida) and a major electricity company (ENDESA) were
reprivatized through this technique during the third phase (1985-
1986), after the government had taken over their control during
the economic and financial crisis of the early 1980s.
Shares were sold by CORFO directly and not through the stock
exchange. For this purpose loans at zero real interest rates with
a maturity of 15 years were granted up to 95 per cent of the
sales price. In addition, the buyers could claim 20 per cent of
the investment as credit against their future income tax liabili-
ty and benefited from a 30 per cent reduction of amortization
payments if the loans were repaid in time. "Popular capitalism"
thus involved considerable subsidization in the context of priva-
tization.
"Labour capitalism": Worker participation in ownership and
management was promoted as another means to achieve a wider
distribution of.. share capital. It was realized through sales to
worker associations or individual workers. Initially confined to
the workers of the company concerned, worker participation was
extended later to public sector employees in general, including
The price to be paid was generally fixed on the basis of the
stock market price of the preceding period and was lower than
the trading price on the day of offer [Saez, 1991, p. 35].- 10 -
the army [Saez, 1991, p. 34]. None of them was allowed to hold
more than 20 per cent of the share capital of an enterprise ex-
cept in the case of employee buy-outs. Workers could use 50 per
cent of their retirement funds for payments of share purchases or
as collateral for loans from CORFO. The interest rates for such
loans were usually below market rates. In some cases, workers
were even entitled to return the shares at their original prices
if they did not prove profitable later. As in the case of "popu-
lar capitalism" , the risk for the participants was kept to the
minimum. About one-third of the public work force participated in
privatization programs by the middle of the 19 80s [Nankani, 1988,
p. 30] .
In addition to the above methods, shares were sold to pension
funds after the state-run retirement pension schemes were re-
placed by privately run financing societies in 1980. Pension
funds are estimated to have bought around 15 per cent of the
share capital of privatized public enterprises. Their partici-
pation was particularly strong in the case of public utility
companies [Nankani, 1988, p. 32]. Furthermore, the engagement of
foreign investors in the privatization of state enterprises was
encouraged more strongly than in the earlier phases. Favourable
conditions were offered in the context of debt-equity swaps which
enabled Chile to reduce its foreign debt through privatizing
state enterprises (see also Section III.3.).
It is an open question whether the alternatives to competitive
bidding adopted in Chile during the 1980s show the correct way to
privatization in post-socialist countries. The evidence that
competitive bidding caused "excessive concentration" is rather
weak. The effects of concentration on the degree of competition
and economic performance are highly ambiguous on both theoretical
Yotopoulos concluded [1989, p. 696]: "The reduction in the
number of firms seems to be well established, while its cause,
whether the elimination of inefficient producers or the in-
creasing monopolization to which privatization might have
contributed, is more difficult to determine".- 11 -
and empirical grounds. They depend, inter alia, on whether con-
centration takes place in the production of tradeables or in the
non-traded goods sector. Negative effects for tradeables can be
avoided if import competition is sufficiently strong.
The alternatives to competitive bidding need not necessarily
result in less concentration in the longer run. Widely distri-
buted shares may become heavily concentrated in a few hands if
the public is not interested in holding them and trading of
shares is allowed. Upper limits imposed on individual share-
holdings can be circumvented by purchases through "strawmen".
Moreover, a wide distribution of ownership involves trade-offs.
It may seriously impede the effective control of the firm's
management by private owners. In Chile, principal-agent problems
were aggravated by offering shares to the public at highly con-
cessional terms. The subsidization of "popular" and "labour capi-
talism" reduced the risk of individual shareholders and further
weakened their incentives to monitor and control the management.
In the case of "labour capitalism", both efficiency and equity
objectives are unlikely to be fulfilled. Incentives to reduce the
typical overstaffing of inefficient firms are minimized. Equity
criteria are violated because the wealth effects depend on the
vastly different economic shapes of firms and because other popu-
lation segments do not benefit at all.
The economic costs inherent in the Chilean approach suggest that
post-socialist countries should consider different ways to buy
political support for privatization. A fair and equitable distri-
bution of benefits of privatization is not precluded by compe-
titive bidding [Schmieding, 1992]. The revenues from direct sales
to the highest bidder may be distributed through flat per-capita
transfers or compensating tax cuts. Alternatively, the public may
be offered shares in independent holding companies (or priva-
For a discussion on the effects of different modes of privati-
zation on corporate governance, see Frydman, Rapazynski [1992];
Schmieding [1992, p. 103].- 12 -
tization agencies) which control the state enterprises and manage
their privatization.
Notwithstanding, the shortcomings of the bidding process in Chile
during the 1970s have to be avoided. This applies above all to
the financing of enterprise sales. The extension of government
loans in the absence of basic solvency laws and supervisory-
bodies encouraged privately owned conglomerates to acquire more
firms than they could manage. Financial fragility was not con-
sidered a major problem, probably because the conglomerates anti-
cipated government bail-outs in order to prevent major bankrupt-
cies and avoid far-reaching macroeconomic consequences. This
expectation proved to be correct in the early 1980s. The finan-
cing of privatization in its debt-led phase had as a consequence
that a significant part of private investors' risk remained with
the state.
It is unlikely that the drawbacks of financing privatization by
public loans can be avoided by better screening of private inves-
tors . This is even more true for Eastern Europe than it was for
Chile. Governments lack the relevant information and experience
for assessing the financial and managerial capabilities of in-
dividual investors. It is rather advisable for post-socialist
countries to adopt the well established laws on basic solvency
and portfolio criteria of a more advanced market economy. More-
over, privatization must be financed in a way that disposes the
state of microeconomic risks and avoids moral hazard by private
investors.
i
2. Privatization, Stabilization and Structural Reforms
Appropriate methods of divestiture alone do not guarantee the
success of privatization. Failure may also result from an inade-
quate sequencing of privatization in the economic transition to a
market economy. Privatization is particularly difficult under
conditions of pronounced macroeconomic instability and distorted
market structures. It was exactly in such an environment thatBibliofhek
des Institute fur Weltwfrfschof!
- 13 -
privatization was initiated in Chile. Consequently, the Chilean
experience may help in deciding whether instabilities and distor-
tions should be removed before privatization is undertaken.
During the Allende government, the Chilean economy suffered from
excessive public control of agriculture and industry, huge budget
deficits, high tariff and non-tariff protection, overvalued ex-
change rates, high inflation, negative real interest rates, price
and wage controls, etc. In 1973, the military government shifted
emphasis from state intervention to free market policies. It
started with a comprehensive reform program encompassing macro-
economic consolidation and far-reaching structural changes to
improve efficiency and stabilize the economy. The reform program
envisaged large-scale privatization from the beginning. By 1978,
most of the companies under CORFO's control were denationalized.
Privatization in Chile was accompanied with liberalization and
structural reforms. Foreign trade was freed from quantitative
restrictions soon after 1973. Import tariffs were reduced from
about 94 per cent on an average to a flat rate of 10 per cent in
1979 [Saez, 1991, p. 8]. At the same time, export subsidies were
eliminated. Restrictions on external capital movements were re-
moved. The financial sector was greatly deregulated. This in-
volved lowering of reserve requirements, removal of government
interference in 'credit extension with regard to both the selec-
tion of borrowers and the amount of credit, freeing of interest
rates, etc. Private financial companies were allowed to be formed
liberally without any control on debt to asset ratios. In order
to stabilize the economy, the government adhered to monetarist
policies and got rid of fiscal deficits. Price controls were
lifted. Loss of power by trade unions resulted in a de-facto
deregulation of labour markets. The social security system was
privatized in 1981. Enterprises which remained under government
However, some of the remaining state-owned enterprises were
among the largest in terms of net worth [Yotopoulos, 1989, p.
691].- 14 -
control reduced redundant labour and improved their performance
in terms of savings, tax payments and transfers to the government
budget.
The economic policy of the military government had remarkable
success until the recession in 1982-1983. For example, the infla-
tion which was marked by nearly 500 per cent in 19 7 3 and 1974 was
reduced to 20 and 10 per cent in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The
budget deficit amounting to nearly 25 per cent of GDP in 197 3 was
turned into surplus by 1979. The inflow of foreign capital in-
creased. GDP registered an annual growth of 4 to 10 per cent
between 197 6 and 1981 [Yotopoulos, 1989, Tables 1 and 2].
Some of these achievements were nullified by the recession. GDP
growth became negative, unemployment rose, so did the budget
deficit. The recession was aggravated by worsening international
economic conditions, e.g. high inflation, steeply increasing
interest rates, declining commodity prices and the debt crisis.
However, the major blame for the Chilean economic crisis has been
put on domestic policy failures that materialized in the early
1980s. The reform program suffered from serious inconsistencies.
The exchange rate was fixed to the US-dollar in June 1979, while
backward wage indexation was maintained and capital inflows were
not sterilized [Corbo, 1985; Edwards, 1991]. The result was a
significant real appreciation of the local currency which eroded
Chile's international competitiveness.
Some critics go further in claiming that the crisis was due to
too many reforms in too short a time. Particularly the sequencing
of privatization is regarded as inappropriate [Meller, 1990, p.
.83]. According to this view, excessive privatization is reflected
in the fact that by 1983 about 70 per cent of the firms priva-
tized during 1975-1978 either went bankrupt or were brought under
However, economic reforms were accompanied with a steep rise in
the unemployment rate in the early years of the transformation
process. The rate decreased from its 1976-peak in the subse-
quent years, but remained substantially above the level of the
early 1970s.- 15 -
state control again. More than 50 enterprises and banks belonged
to the latter category [Nankani, 1988, pp. 27-28]. The textile
and metallurgic industries which had traditionally been highly
protected and were not able to withstand competition after the
liberalization of foreign trade were very highly affected.
The motivation to sell off state enterprises quickly to reduce
budget deficits [Vickers, Yarrow, 1991, p. 126] resulted in
highly leveraged companies. They could not withstand the reces-
sionary impact on demand. The failure of individual enterprises
triggered serious contagion effects due to strong financial
linkages among enterprises and between industrial units and
banks. Debt-led privatization before basic solvency and port-
folio requirements were enforced was inconsistent with financial
stability under conditions of recession. To contain the financial
and economic crisis, the government took over the management of
firms of public importance, especially banks, with a view to
reprivatize them to new owners later.
In contrast to the earlier privatizations, this reprivatization
(1985-1986) proceeded under conditions of macroeconomic stability
and well established incentive systems at the micro level. More-
over, laws against ownership concentration were implemented.
Large investors were no longer allowed to use the assets of an
acquired state enterprise as collateral to buy another state
enterprise. Related party loans were defined as one loan. For
this purpose rules were introduced to define related parties, a
conglomerate or a group of shareholders. Further, the privatized
corporations were obliged by law to disclose their balance
sheets, stock purchases or sales, and to distribute at least 30
per cent of their profits [Pifiera and Glade, 1991, p. 23]. These
measures were expected to increase the sustainability of privati-
zation .
About.half of the foreign debt of the entire financial sector
was owed by the two largest conglomerates in December 1982
[Saez, 1991, p. 8].- 16 -
After the reprivatization of corporations in the mid-1980s, the
government was left with about 40 corporations which pre-dated
the Allende regime and were mostly in the public utilities and
mining sectors. The new rules also applied to their privatiza-
tion. No investor was allowed to buy more than 20 per cent of the
share capital [Pifiera, Glade, 1991, p. 32]. The corporations were
privatized in healthy conditions. In some cases, old debts were
transfered to CORFO before enterprises were offered for sale. The
divestiture was carried through successively according to the
absorptive capacity of the market in order to avoid pressure on
sales prices. Some of the large public enterprises were divided
into subsidiaries to facilitate their divestiture successively.
The privatization in Chile came more or less to an end in March
199 0 when an elected government took office. It announced in 1991
to increase the private participation in the remaining large
state-owned enterprises through additional investment in expan-
sion, but not by selling the existing assets [Saez, 1991, p. 6].
The more cautious and gradualistic approach adopted in recent
privatization phases is commonly understood as the result of the
necessary learning process induced by the economic and financial
crisis of 1982-1983. The Chilean experience indeed suggests that
an appropriate sequencing is important for the success of priva-
tization. The number of enterprise failures could have been re-
duced by more appropriate privatization methods, especially with
respect to financing arrangements (Section III.l.). This under-
lines the earlier conclusion that large-scale privatization re-
quires that a regulatory framework of basic rules and institu-
tions supervising and enforcing such rules is established from
the beginning.
Many of the enterprises sold to private investors in Chile in the
1970s were candidates for liquidation, rather than privatization
[Nankani, 1990, p. 44]. Notwithstanding, it would be misleading
to conclude from the bankruptcies and rescue operations that
privatization must be postponed until after macroeconomic stabi-
lity has been restored and microeconomic incentive systems have- 17 -
been reformed. It is the transparency of the rules of the game
which matters for stabilizing expectations and reducing uncer-
tainty. Hence, it would be sufficient to announce clearly the
future course of economic policy before privatization is ini-
tiated. As concerns macroeconomic stabilization, much depends on
the credibility of announced fiscal consolidation. The Chilean
experience indicates that the phasing out of government support
for individual enterprises would be more credible if state-owned
conglomerates were split up for the purpose of privatization.
Politically, it is more feasible to impose harder budget con-
straints on smaller privatized enterprises because their failure
would not trigger off far-reaching macroeconomic effects. As
concerns structural reforms, the evidence from Chile suggests
that it is most important to provide clear signals on future
trade policy. The privatization of enterprises producing in sec-
tors which have been highly protected so far would then no longer
be based on wrong expectations of buyers for continued import
protection.
Further, policy announcements must be consistent for privati-
zation to be sustainable. Major inconsistencies, for example
between trade policies on the one hand and exchange rate and
monetary policies on the other hand, undermine the transition to
a market economy. In the case of Chile, inconsistent policies
deepened the crisis of the early 1980s which, in turn, resulted
in the failure of earlier privatization programs. This indicates
that consistency is a major challenge for privatization to
succeed in Eastern Europe.
3. Consequences and Sustainability of Privatization during
Economic Transition
The sustainability of privatization may suffer not only from
misconceived privatization methods and inconsistent policies
during the transformation to a market economy. Additional strains
For a more general discussion on consistency and credibility,
see Funke [1991].- 18 -
may come from short-term economic consequences of privatization
which are difficult to avoid even under the most favourable cir-
cumstances. Major concerns relate to (i) increasing unemployment
which may undermine the public support for privatization, (ii)
deteriorating fiscal balances caused by large-scale privatizat-
ion, and (iii) the capital market effects of privatization. The
subsequent discussion on the Chilean experience in these respects
reveals that it is extremely difficult to isolate the effects of
privatization from other influences. Nevertheless, tentative
evidence may help to assess the justification of the above con-
cerns .
Employment: The rate of unemployment increased considerably in
Chile after 1973 (Table 1). But this unfavourable development
cannot be ascribed to privatization according to a detailed com-
parative study of a large sample of Chilean enterprises during
1965 and 1978 by Hachette and Liiders [1991]. The rise in unem-
ployment was instead related with the introduction of efficiency
rules in public enterprises and with structural changes which
applied to both the public and the private sector.
After overthrowing the Allende government, the military regime
asked the state enterprises to reduce redundant labour. Employ-
ment in this sector went down as a result of the government's
determination to achieve fiscal consolidation by eliminating the
heavy subsidization of inefficient state enterprises. These
enterprises were not privatized until the second half of the
1980s and some of them are still publicly owned.
Government subsidies to state enterprises represented the most
important source of the fiscal deficit of 25 per cent of GDP in
1973 [Liiders, not dated, p. 8]. Subsequently, transfers to
state enterprises became the exception rather than the rule.
Income tax concessions and import duty exemptions were also
eliminated. The deficit of the public sector enterprises was
reduced from 12.4 per cent of GDP in 1973 to 0.6 per cent in

















































































































































































































































Source: World Bank [1991]; Hachette, Liiders [1991].- 20 -
The subjection of enterprises in the private and the public sec-
tor to market rules could be expected to result in an increase of
transitional unemployment. Problems of economic transition are
reflected in GDP growth figures which remained low or even nega-
tive in the mid-197 0s, but picked up remarkably thereafter (Table
1). By contrast, employment did not recover significantly even if
a lagged response of demand for labour is taken into account.
Unemployment rates reached unprecidented levels in the early
1980s. This has to be attributed to adverse world-market develop-
ments and inconsistent internal policies, rather than to privati-
zation per se. Among international factors, the second oil price
hike, the worldwide recession and the international debt crisis
stand out. The adjustment to external shocks became increasingly
difficult because of policy inconsistencies (Section III.2.).
Wage indexation resulted in an inflexible structure of real wages
at a time when wage flexibility was required [Corbo, 1985, p.
899]. Moreover, it led to an automatic increase in real wages
since 1977 as inflation was declining [Edwards, 1991, p. 31].
State enterprises which were privatized during the second half of
the 1980s, have generally recorded an increase in employment
[Saez, 19 91, Table 9]. As the earlier rise in unemployment, this
favourable trend cannot be linked directly to privatization. This
period was marked by increasing growth rates (Table 1). Private
and public firms had to employ more people to satisfy additional
demand since they had no excess labour due to rationalization
measures adopted since the 1970s. In summary, the Chilean example
reveals that the employment effects of privatization are dif-
ficult to disentangle from other influences. There is no evi-
dence, however, to blame privatization for giving rise to serious
employment problems. The overstaffing of inefficient firms was
unsustainable even if they had remained under state control.
Fiscal effects: Similar difficulties are encountered in identify-
ing the fiscal consequences of privatization. Only the direct
effects of enterprise sales on the budget can be measured easily.
It is, thus, not surprising that attention in Chile was focused- 21 -
on this aspect. The pressing need to reduce huge public sector
deficits added to the short-term motivation to maximize sales
proceeds from the privatization of state enterprises. Receipts
from privatization represented 3 to 10 per cent of annual govern-
ment revenues in the second half of the 1970s when the fiscal
motivation of privatization was particularly strong (Table 1).
However, receipts from privatization have only an once-and-for-
all effect on the public budget. Fiscal consolidation in Chile
was sustained because of tax reforms and improved tax collection
as well as significant cuts in government expenditures [Corbo,
.1985, p. 916]. The elimination of subsidies to inefficient state
enterprises helped to reduce the share of public sector expendi-
ture in GDP from 45 per cent in 1973 to about 23 per cent in
1978-1980 (Table 1). This indicates that it is the hardening of
the budget constraints of enterprises which matters most with
respect to sustained fiscal consolidation.
In principle, the elimination of soft budget constraints may be
easier once enterprises are privatized [Nunnenkamp, Schmieding,
1991, p. 14]. The Chilean example suggests, however, that this is
not necessarily so. It may even be argued that the earlier empha-
sis on the maximization of sales proceeds threatened fiscal con-
solidation in the longer run. High selling prices could be rea-
lized only through the provision of public loans to private
buyers. This debt-led privatization resulted in financial
fragility of large conglomerates. The government had virtually no
choice but to rescue these enterprises in order to contain con-
tagion effects. In so far as such a government behaviour was
anticipated by the borrowing firms their budget constraints were
not hardened effectively.
The indirect fiscal effects of privatization and public enter-
prise reform can hardly be captured in quantitative terms. The
cash flows from the government budget to enterprises, and vice
versa, would have to be compared to the situation without
reforms. Similar problems arise with regard to tax revenues
which may be derived from additional income generated by
privatization.- 22 -
All in all, the case of Chile supports the view that the sale of
state enterprises is no substitute for sustained fiscal correc-
tion [Blanchard, Layard, 1992, p. 30]. Governments in Eastern
Europe should avoid a fiscal myopia and resist the temptation to
achieve higher selling prices by sharing the risk of subsequent
failure of privatized enterprises. The focus must be on the
credible elimination of soft budget constraints to help
sustaining fiscal consolidation. The widespread concern about
"too low" selling prices neglects the less visible effects which
privatization exercizes indirectly on public sector accounts.
Capital market development: The Chilean experience points out
another drawback of high selling prices as a result of fiscal
myopia and debt-led privatization, i.e., extremely high real
interest rates. The real short-term lending rate on Peso loans
soared to 64 per cent in 1976 and remained above 4 0 per cent
until 1978 (Table 1). Again it is difficult to isolate the
interest rate effect of debt-led privatization from other in-
fluences, such as the substantial undercapitalization of most
firms after the Allende regime, the increase of credit demand
induced by the lack of appropriate loan evaluation, and monetary
restraint [Corbo, 1985, p. 899]. It is hardly to be disputed,
however, that the financing of privatization during the early
years of the military government had a significant impact on
interest rates.
The second hike in real interest rates in 1981-1982 has to be
attributed to distress borrowing before and during the finan-
cial crisis. Since 1982, it became difficult to raise foreign
loans. The financial crisis resulting in state intervention,
direct government supervision or closure of privatized banks
and other financial institutions, including pension funds, was
a great blow to the Chilean capital market. Two banks and six
other financial institutions were intervened by the government
in December 1981. Later in January 1983 five more banks were
added to this list, other three banks were closed and two were
put under direct government supervision. These latter 10 banks
accounted for 45 per cent of the capital and reserves of the
whole financial system [Saez, 1991, pp. 9-10].- 23 -
The high difference between real interest rates on domestic
Peso loans and US-dollar loans (16-48 percentage points in the
second half of the 1970s; Corsepius [1988, pp. 15 f.]) added to
the detrimental effects of debt-led privatization. Low or even
negative real interest rates on US-dollar loans induced heavy
borrowing from abroad, once the limits on US-dollar loans were
removed with the opening of the external capital account and the
exchange rate risk was minimized by fixing of the nominal ex-
change rate [Corsepius, 1988; Yotopoulos, 1989, pp. 602 f.]. In
practice, the access to cheap foreign loans was confined to a few
conglomerates and large banks [see also Foxley, 1983, p. 112]. As
a result, competitive bidding for state enterprises was biased in
favour of large private investors with access to foreign
financing. The effective discrimination of smaller investors in
capital .markets added to the concentration of risks during the
earlier privatization phases in Chile.
The concentration of risks was further aggravated by the unfa-
vourable structure of external financing. Foreign borrowing was
favoured at the expense of foreign direct investment (FDI). In
1974-1979, FDI amounted to only two thirds of that in the period
1964-1968 [Yotopoulos, 1989, p. 695]. The ratio of debt inflows
to inflows of FDI, which was below 5 in 1975, more than doubled
in 1977-1981 [Corsepius, 1988, p. 12]. The weak participation of
foreign investors in the privatizations of the 1970s had as a
consequence that entrepreneurial risks remained mainly with do-
mestic investors who were less able to bear them in times of
crisis. A greater diversification of risks could have been
achieved if privatizations had been financed to a larger extent
by FDI.
The imbalance in foreign financing was reduced by the Chilean
authorities during the reprivatization of government controlled
enterprises in the 1980s. Especially some of the larger re-
privatized companies were acquired jointly by local and foreign
investors, which helped to avoid excessive indebtedness [Liiders,
not dated, pp. 11 f.]. The participation of foreign investors was- 24 -
mainly through debt-equity swaps. Chilean external debt certifi-
cates were bought by foreign investors on the secondary market at
a 30-40 per cent discount on the face value [Meller, 1990, p.
83]. The certificates were then redeemed at par by the central
bank, provided these funds were used to acquire state enterpri-
ses . The degree of subsidization of foreign investors involved in
debt-equity swaps is open to question [Liiders, not dated, p. 12].
Benefits from secondary market discounts were reduced if competi-
tion among foreign investors raised the prices of the re-
privatized enterprises. But such price increases would have led
to the discrimination of local investors in the competitive
bidding for state enterprises, unless local investors were
offered similar incentives.
The emphasis placed on new privatization methods such as "popu-
lar" and "labour capitalism" in the 1980s stimulated domestic
capital market development through the participation of small
local investors. The new methods resulted in 127000 additional
shareholders between 1984 and 1989 [Saez, 1991, p. 45]. The total
value of transactions on the stock exchange increased by nearly
22 times, and the share of divested companies in these trans-
actions rose from 6 to 66 per cent during the same period
[Liiders, not dated, p. 25]. Also the bond market became heavily
dependent on the divested companies. They issued about four
fifths of all company bonds in 1989 and 1990 [Saez, 1991, p. 46].
A very important contribution to the growth of the Chilean capi-
tal market was from the pension funds which were allowed to par-
ticipate in the capital transactions of privatized companies. By
the end of 1990, they were holding influential portions of stocks
of several privatized companies.
Especially the significant involvement of pension funds in the
privatization process has contributed to enhanced stability and
growth of capital markets in Chile. However, the favourable
impact of new privatization methods on capital market development
must not be seen in isolation. A wider spreading of shares may
render the effective control of management by owners extremely- 25 -
difficult. To resolve this conflict post-socialist countries
should find out ways to promote capital market development with-
out compromizing on corporate governance. The earlier suggestion
to distribute widely shares in independent holding companies or
privatization agencies, rather than in privatized enterprises,
may be helpful in this respect. The trading of shares in holding
companies provides the stimulus to widen the spectrum of capital
market instruments and encourages active participation of the
public. The privatization of enterprises through competitive
bidding, managed by the holding companies, not only helps
effective corporate governance. It also allows to attract FDI
which can play a significant role in alleviating bottlenecks to
privatization that result from poorly developed domestic capital
markets.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The empirical evidence on large-scale privatization programs to
which governments in Central and Eastern Europe may refer in
assessing the pros and cons of different privatization methods
and alternative suggestions on sequencing is extremely limited.
However, the Chilean experience with large-scale privatization in
the 1970s and 1980s offers a most instructive reference case. The
conditions under which privatization was initiated in Chile
after the socialist Allende regime reveal remarkable similarities
to the present situation in Eastern Europe. State enterprises
dominated all important economic sectors. Privatization was moti-
vated by a variety of goals which were at least partly in con-
flict with each other. Domestic capital markets were weak, and
basic institutional and regulatory issues unresolved. The govern-
ment tried various privatization methods with mixed results. Most
importantly, the Chilean privatizations started while the economy
was in the midst of a drastic stabilization and liberalization
process. The achievements and pitfalls with regard to the methods
and sequencing of privatization in Chile should, therefore, no
longer be ignored in the discussion on appropriate privatization- 26 -
schemes in Eastern Europe.
As concerns privatization methods, the first lesson from the
Chilean experience is that privatization through competitive
bidding is likely to fail if large private investors have easy-
access to public loans to finance the acquisition of state firms.
Basic solvency rules need to be in place and enforced to enhance
the financial stability of enterprises and banks. Furthermore,
privatization should be financed in a way that disposes the state
of entrepreneurial risks and contains moral hazard of buyers.
Fiscal myopia must be avoided. Higher selling prices achieved
only through public loans and risk sharing with the private sec-
tor undermine the sustainability of fiscal consolidation. Especi-
ally large borrowers anticipate government bail-outs in times of
a financial crisis. The widespread concern about "too low"
selling prices ignores the longer-term costs resulting from "too
high" selling prices. Price concessions required for transfering
entrepreneurial risks to the private owners should not be resis-
ted because of equity considerations.
Once the drawbacks of debt-led privatization are avoided, com-
petitive bidding seems to be better suited for the economic
transformation of Eastern Europe than alternative privatization
methods. The case of Chile indicates that the promotion of public
participation in the privatization of state enterprises involves
considerable costs in terms of subsidies and preferential sales
prices. Given the current fiscal constraints, most post-socialist
countries are less able to bear these costs than Chile in the
1980s. Furthermore, a wide distribution of shares impedes the
effective control of the firms' management by the owners. Prin-
cipal-agent problems are aggravated if enterprise shares are
offered to the public at highly concessional terms. The second
lesson is, thus, to consider other ways to buy public support for
privatization without interfering with economic efficiency. A
fair and equitable distribution of benefits of privatization can
be achieved, for example, when revenues from direct sales to the
highest bidder are distributed through compensating tax cuts. If- 27 -
widespread shareholding is prefered, the public should be offered
shares in independent holding companies or privatization agen-
cies , rather than in individual enterprises.
Thirdly, the Chilean experience suggests that an appropriate
sequencing is important for the success of privatization. Large-
scale privatization requires that a regulatory framework of basic
rules and institutions supervising and enforcing such rules is
established from the beginning. The most promising way for East
European governments to avoid delay in this respect would be to
adopt the well established laws and regulations of a more
advanced market economy, and to ask for technical assistance in
institution building. From bankruptcies and renationalization of
enterprises, which had been privatized in the early phases of
Chile's economic transition, it cannot be concluded that privati-
zation should be postponed until after macroeconomic stability
has been restored and microeconomic incentive systems have been
reformed. It is crucially important, however, to clearly announce
the future course of economic policy when privatization is initi-
ated. For stabilizing the expectations of buyers and reducing the
uncertainty of private investors fiscal consolidation must be
credible, signals on foreign trade policy and especially the
phasing-out of import protection very clear, and policy announce-
ments consistent. Otherwise, the sustainability of privatization
will be at serious risk.
The fourth lesson also relates to the sequencing of privatiza-
tion. The case of Chile does not support the view that privati-
zation should be postponed in order to contain negative effects
on employment and fiscal balances in the short run. It is not to
be disputed that rising unemployment may undermine the political
support for economic transformation. There is no evidence, how-
ever, to blame privatization for giving rise to serious employ-
ment problems once it is realized that the overstaffing of inef-
ficient firms is unsustainable, even if they remain under state
control. Transitional unemployment and the ensuing political
problems should be alleviated by adequate social security pro-- 28 -
visions, rather than conserving inefficient and inflexible pro-
duction structures. Fiscal considerations must not be focused on
the once-and-for-all effect of enterprise sales on the government
budget. It is the hardening of the budget constraints of enter-
prises which matters most with respect to sustained fiscal con-
solidation. Privatization will help to eliminate soft budget
constraints, provided governments in Eastern Europe resist the
temptation to achieve higher selling prices by sharing the risk
of subsequent failure of privatized enterprises.
The undercapitalization of state enterprises, weak domestic capi-
tal markets and the drawbacks of debt-led privatization suggest a
final lesson on risk sharing. Foreign investors should be en-
couraged to participate in the privatization of state enterpri-
ses. This would not only add to the amount of investable funds in
post-socialist countries, but also provide access to much needed
managerial and technological know-how. Highly indebted countries
in Eastern Europe may stimulate foreign direct investment through
debt-equity swaps, as did Chile in the 1980s. To avoid a dis-
crimination of local investors they should be allowed to partici-
pate in debt-equity swaps. Especially the engagement of institu-
tional investors such as pension funds could enhance the stabili-
ty and growth of domestic capital markets. This may also help to
contain a public resentment to strong foreign influence in the
domestic economy.- 29 -
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